The RAND COIN Scoresheet And The Irish Civil War

The Civil War was a very different conflict to that fought between the IRA and the British. It was a successful COIN campaign, a very rare thing. What does the RAND scoresheet have to say about it?

Good Factors

1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors (Score 1 if sum of a through g is at least 2)A decisive Yes.

- a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) (Score 1 if YES)Yes, I think they accomplished this, stamping their authority on the state.

- b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) (Score 1 if YES)Yes, the provisional government was able to govern and maintain credibility.

- c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach (Score 1 if YES)Again, yes, stopping the insurgency, reintroducing rule of law, etc.

- d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations (Score 1 if YES)  - Yes, victory over the anti-Treaty forces was the aim, this was achieved.

- e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies (Score 1 if YES)Yes, the government was able to direct messages and themes, though this may have been mostly due to the large military presence within the government.

- f. Earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort (Score 1 if YES)Yes, the pro-Treaty side maintained an effective propaganda effort.

- g. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained (Score 1 if YES) – Yes, in line with “e”.

2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors (Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3)An decisive yes.

- a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent (Score 1 if YES)Not strictly applicable.

- b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES) – I’m not sure the anti-Treaty side had any external financing worth mentioning.

- c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES)Again, never really existed in numbers like those during the WoI.

- d. Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources significantly diminished (Score 1 if YES) Yes, I would argue the pro-Treaty side were eventually successful in this regard, with the aid of the sympathetic civilian population.

- e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size (Score 1 if YES)Yes, the Irregulars had huge recruiting problems past the opening months of the war.

- f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes (Score 1 if YES)Strictly speaking, yes.

- g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting (Score 1 if YES)Yes.

- h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition (Score 1 if YES)Yes.

- i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence (Score 1 if YES)Yes, big time.

- j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing (Score 1 if YES)Yes.

3. Government realizes at least two government legitimacy factors (Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2)Yes.

- a. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict (Score 1 if YES)Yes, though they were starting from scratch.

- b. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)Yes, elections were held after all.

- c. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate (Score 1 if YES)Yes, borne out by election results.

- d. Government provides better governance than insurgents in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES) – Yes, anti-Treaty “governance”, was non-existent for the most part.

- e. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control (Score 1 if YES)Yes, far better than the anti-Treaty side.

4. Government realizes at least one democracy factor (Score 1 if sum of a through d is at least 1) – Difficult to answer given the circumstances, but I’ll rate it a yes.

- a. Government a functional democracy (Score 1 if YES) –Arguable, since many TD’s were on the anti-Treaty side I’ll say No.

- b. Government a partial or transitional democracy (Score 1 if YES)Yes, this is fairer to say.

- c. Free and fair elections held (Score 1 if YES) – Yes.

- d. Government respects human rights and allows free press (Score 1 if YES)No, the government controlled most of the press.

5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)Yes.

- a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force’s terms (Score 1 if YES)Yes, very much so.

- b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations (Score 1 if YES)Again, Yes.

6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (Score 1 if YES)Yes, obviously, after the defensive line in Munster was smashed.

7. Government/state is competent (Score 1 if YES) I will say yes, especially compared to the anti-Treaty side.

8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force (Score 1 if YES)Yes, though some incidents could be debated, especially the use of artillery.

9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)Yes, this is fair to say. The provisional government were not conquerors by any means.

10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force (Score 1 if YES)No, I wouldn’t say so.

11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favours COIN forces (Score 1 if YES) A big and very important Yes.

12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas (Score 1 if YES) – Yes. The whole first phase of the conflict showed this.

13. COIN force has and uses uncontested air dominance (Score 1 if YES)Yes, though not a hugely important factor.

14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control (Score 1 if YES)Yes.

15. Perception of security being created or maintained among populations in areas COIN force claims to control (Score 1 if YES)Yes, this perception existed through the better governance provided.

NOTE: IO = information operations. PSYOP = psychological operations.

Bad Factors

1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)No.

- a. COIN force employs escalating repression (Score 1 if YES)No, not large-scale anyway.

- b. COIN force employs collective punishment (Score 1 if YES)No, not against civilian targets in a large scale sense.

2. Primary COIN force perceived to be an external occupier (Score 1 if YES)No, this was not the case.

3. COIN force or government actions contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by the insurgents (Score 1 if YES)No, the people weren’t listening.

4. Militias work at cross-purposes with COIN force/government (Score 1 if YES)Not applicable.

5. COIN force resettles/removes civilian populations for population control (Score 1 if YES) – No.

6. COIN force collateral damage perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than insurgents’ (Score 1 if YES)No, with possible exceptions in west Cork and Kerry.

7. In area of conflict, COIN force perceived as worse than insurgents (Score 1 if YES)  - No.

8. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics (Score 1 if YES)No, the complete opposite in fact.

9. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents (Score 1 if YES)In parts perhaps, but not large scale.

10. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated (Score 1 if YES)No, not on either count.

11. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment (Score 1 if YES)No.

12. COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment (Score 1 if YES)No, the opposite.

That gives the pro-Treaty side a massive 14-0 victory.

Of course, all of this is only really for my own personnel interest (I like playing around with this kind of thing), and it’s difficult to really try and apply this kind of criteria to conflicts of the past, especially those of so long ago. The result offered for the Civil War may be somewhat of an accurate score for that conflict, but that for the WoI is really not. This does not change the fact that we can gain many lessons from history (in this case, the failure of the British COIN effort in comparison to the success of the pro-Treaty, and why that was) but this only goes so far.

This entry was posted in Counter Insurgency (COIN), History, Ireland, War and tagged , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

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